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Abstract. The essay reflects upon the debate over intentionalism about statutory interpretation, 
and argues for a moderate version of intentionalism. It argues that the debate over 
intentionalism cannot be sorted out without establishing a viable conception of legislative 
authority. The outlines of such a conception are put forward by throwing some light on the 
concept of “representational authority”. The essay also argues that the problem of legal 
interpretation touches upon issues of sovereignty. It implies that some important issues of 
the normative theory of legal interpretation are linked to substantive political philosophical 
problems. 
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Introduction 
 
The following essay is a contribution to the age-old debate among jurists over 
the proper role of legislative intentions in statutory interpretation. The debate 
plays out in legal theory as the controversy between intentionalists and non-
intentionalists. Intentionalists claim that legislative intentions play an important 
role in statutory interpretation. Non-intentionalists, on the other hand, insist that 
legislative intentions cannot have that role: intentionalist methods are forbidden 
in the legal practice.1 My analysis will present an incomplete argument for a 
version of intentionalism about statutory interpretation. The argument is based 
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on certain conceptual considerations concerning the authority of statutory 
provisions.  
 I deliberately employ here a rather broad and weak formulation of inten-
tionalism that does not refer to one particular interpretive method.2 Intentionalism, 
as I depict it here, can take several forms. One option is linking the inten-
tionalist position to the well-known view that textual interpretation is about 
retrieving authorial intentions, and regarding legislators as the authors of 
statutes. Another option is the claim that, although textual interpretation is not 
necessarily about retrieving intentions, there is something special about legal 
interpretation that vindicates intentionalist interpretive strategies. And an inten-
tionalist can also claim that intentionalist interpretive strategies should play a 
vital but only partial role in legal interpretation.  
 As the preliminary remarks should make it obvious, the present essay 
concentrates on the problems of normative theories of legal interpretation that 
engage with norms that determine what qualifies as a successful legal inter-
pretation or as a justifiable interpretive strategy. For this reason, I do not 
undertake to defend here any descriptive theory of legal interpretation. How-
ever, each normative theory of legal interpretation presupposes something that 
belongs to the realm of descriptive theories: a plausible account of the process 
and the constitutive features of legal interpretation. Without such an account in 
its background, a normative theory of legal interpretations is totally irrelevant. 
For this reason, it may be useful to reveal the main conceptual points about 
interpretation and legal interpretation that I will rely on. As this is not the task 
of the present analysis, I do not provide arguments for them, but I hope that 
they are not too controversial, and will not scare off my potential readers. 
 First, a few words on interpretation itself. When we talk about interpretation, 
we tend to treat textual interpretation as the central case. As the subject of my 
paper is statutory interpretation, this is not at all against my intentions. However, 
for philosophical reasons, it is better to settle for a more general definition. 
Interpretation is one of the activities directed towards understanding meaning.3 
Of course, its theoretical problem is not identical with that of understanding 
meaning: interpretation actually presupposes the ability of understanding 
  
 2 In light of the wide variety of the uses of the “argument from intention”, it would 
seem rather odd to talk about one particular intentionalist interpretive method. Cf. 
MacCormick, N.–Summers, R. S.: Interpretation and Justification. In: MacCormick, N.–
Summers, R. S. (eds.): Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study. Aldershot, 1991. 522–
525.  
 3 See Moore: op. cit. 2. 
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meaning.4 Interpretation is required when understanding meaning is problematic 
in a distinctive way: having access to the pertinent meanings requires some 
effort that is within the scope of our linguistic skills.5 Interpretation should be 
taken as a process that substitutes one linguistic expression for another.6 When 
we effortlessly understand the meaning, which is very often the case,7 inter-
pretation is not necessary. When the meaning to be understood transcends our 
linguistic skills (e.g. when someone speaks to us in a language that we are not 
familiar with), interpretation cannot be successful.  
 As to legal interpretation, the crucial preliminary point is that I take it to be 
strongly connected to legal reasoning. The theoretical problem of legal inter-
pretation is a part of the broader theoretical problem of legal reasoning. The 
link between the two problems is established by the fact that, in modern legal 
systems, legal reasoning normally has to rely on reasons that are drawn from 
recognized sources. It is also characteristic of modern legal systems that the 
law authenticated by the recognised sources is incorporated in written legal 
documents (“legal texts”). Legal reasoning often has to rely on textual inter-
pretation to have access to the relevant legal reasons. Legal reasoning must be 
capable of providing a proper reading of legal texts. It is also important that 
when legal theorists or lawyers speak of legal interpretation they tend to think 
of a specific interpretive activity that figures in the process of making 
particular legal decisions, and I will be no exception. Although a whole series 
of interesting theoretical problems arise from other activities that can also be 
associated with interpreting law (like following or violating the law, or designing 
new laws), the present analysis will ignore them.   
 Of course, there are several kinds of legal texts, and they are all proper 
objects of legal interpretation. One can interpret judicial or administrative 
decisions or even international treaties. But as I have chosen the controversy 
  
 4 See Marmor, A.: Interpretation and Legal Theory. Oxford, 1992. 21. This implies 
the rejection of the view that the theoretical problem of interpretation, at least sensu largo, 
covers the whole problem of understanding. For such a view, see Bankowski, Z.–
MacCormick, N.–Summers, R. S.–Wroblewski, J.: Method and Methodology. In: 
MacCormick–Summers (eds.): Interpreting Statutes…op. cit. 12.  
 5 Dummett, M.: A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and 
Hacking. In: LePore, E. (ed.): Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of 
Donald Davidson. Oxford, 1986. 463. 
 6 Of course, making this point has a Wittgensteinian pedigree (although the relevant 
analysis by Wittgenstein addresses significantly different issues). See Wittgenstein, L.: 
Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, 1958, s. 201. See further Dummett: op. cit. 464.  
 7 Cf. Hacking, I.: The Parody of Conversation. In: LePore (ed.): Truth and Inter-
pretation… op. cit. 451. See further Dummett: op. cit. 464. 
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about intentionalism as the subject of the present paper, I will focus on statutory 
interpretation. I use the terms “legal interpretation” and “statutory inter Allan 
pretation” interchangeably below.  
 
There is a crucial methodological point that I will rely on throughout this essay 
but that I will not try to justify in detail: a normative theory of legal inter-
pretation cannot be some general theory of interpretation applied to law. The 
character of statutory interpretation is very much determined by its function: it 
serves a practical function in being part of a practice that seeks to provide 
practical guidance. This function has a lot to do with the way we think about 
the role of the legislature and the judiciary in the life of our society, that is, with 
issues concerning the proper allocation of institutionalized public authority in a 
political society. It cannot be an accident that most of the theoretical battles 
over legal interpretation are fought in the realm of constitutional theory. And, 
of course, constitutional theory heavily relies on political philosophy.8 Some of 
the relevant theoretical problems of legal interpretation must belong to practical 
philosophy, more specifically to political philosophy. 
 I do not argue, however, that the whole theoretical problem of legal inter-
pretation belongs to political philosophy. Tom Campbell argues for something 
like this, and I would like to distinguish my position from his claims. Campbell 
does not deny that theories concentrating upon the general features of 
interpretation have a bearing on our understanding of legal interpretation.9 But 
he denies the possibility that we can lay the foundations of a normative theory 
of legal interpretation by way of a politically neutral conceptual analysis. The 
views we have about legal interpretation are ultimately dependent upon the 
way we perceive issue like that of the separation of powers, the role of the 
judges, etc.  
 Up to this point, I agree with Campbell’s suggestions. However, he goes on 
to reconsider the very concept of legal interpretation. He treats theories of 
legal interpretation as being inevitably part of a broad political theory about 
the proper allocation of power in society. And as the whole theoretical issue is 
deeply embedded in political philosophy, it seems to him that “selecting a 
theory of legal interpretation (…) is not dependent on any general theory of 
  
 8 See Perry, M. J.: Why Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice (And 
Vice Versa). In: Leyh, G. (ed.): Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1992. 250. 
 9 See Campbell, T.: Grounding Theories of Legal Interpretation. In: Goldsworthy, J.–
Campbell, T. (eds.): Legal Interpretation in Democratic States. Aldershot, 2002. 30. 
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interpretation or controversial theory of meaning.”10 This is where Campbell 
goes too far. What we can legitimately claim is that theories of general inter-
pretation are indeterminate in respect of some crucial issues of legal interpretation, 
and they need to be supplemented with other (e.g. political philosophical) 
considerations. But even if the emphasis shifts towards political philosophy, we 
still need conceptions of legal interpretation that are consistent with some 
viable view on the general features of interpretation. In this sense, selecting a 
theory of legal interpretation is indeed dependent on general theories of inter-
pretation. The practical philosophical considerations that help to account for 
the distinctive features of legal interpretation should not be taken as isolating 
the theoretical analysis from the broader philosophical problem of interpretation.11 
General theories of interpretation are not unimportant for us, but what we can 
learn from them just cannot be enough to lay the foundations for a tenable 
normative theory of legal interpretation.  
 My analysis will face political philosophical problems that are identified as 
intrinsically relevant to normative theory of legal interpretation. However, the 
pertinent political philosophical issues will be left open for they cannot be 
answered adequately on the basis of the considerations mobilized by this essay. 
That is why I said in the first paragraph that the argument presented here would 
be incomplete. 
 Without accepting the abovementioned methodological point about the 
role of political philosophical considerations, I would not have written this 
particular essay. In respect of the general theories of interpretation, I happen to 
be a sort of intentionalist. I believe that any full understanding of a text must 
pay attention to the intentions that gave rise to the speaker’s meanings in the 
interpreted text. If I could take it as implying the truth of intentionalism about 
legal interpretation, the refutation of non-intentionalism would not require a legal 
theoretical analysis. But the challenge of non-intentionalism is more stubborn. 
For one, non-intentionalists can accept that any full interpretation needs to pay 
attention to authorial intentions, and yet insist that legal interpretation aims at 
no more than a partial understanding of the legal text. It is possible that non-
intentionalist interpretive strategies are capable of revealing the “legally relevant” 
  
 10 Ibid. 33. 
 11 For similar reasons, I reject attempts to reduce the whole activity of interpretation to 
some moral or political function. This view is well exemplified by Stanley Fish who 
regards interpretation as the effort of a morality (or agenda) “to extend itself into the world 
by inscribing its message on every available space”. Fish, S.: There is No Such Thing as 
Free Speech and it’s a Good Thing, Too. New York, Oxford, 1994. 142. I do not think that 
such approaches can be coherent. 
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meanings of legal texts, while intentionalist strategies reveal something else–
something legally irrelevant.  
 It indicates that we should pay attention to the features that make legal 
interpretation specific. As far as I can see, those features are associated with 
the close connection between legal interpretation and the process of making 
legal decisions. The following two of them are certainly crucial for us. The first 
is that legal interpretation has a strictly practical orientation. Legal inter-
pretation seeks to reveal the practical guidance that the legal text provides, and 
remains indifferent to anything that goes beyond this task. The second feature 
is that legal interpretation raises issues concerning the agent of interpretation 
in a peculiar way.  
 The first distinctive feature makes it a prerequisite to any plausible theory 
of legal interpretation to have a good understanding of the kind of practical 
guidance that the law seeks to provide, and general theories of interpretation 
are unlikely to be able to facilitate this understanding. A general theory of 
interpretation can make us understand that legal interpretation is guided by 
practical orientations,12 but it cannot be specific enough in respect of the 
relevant practical orientations.13 Practical orientations have many versions, and 
it is simply beyond the reach of a general theory of interpretation to provide the 
necessary specification for the practical orientation inherent in legal inter-
pretation. If we want to identify the kind of practical guidance characteristic of 
law, we face issues concerning the authority of law. Conceptual points about 
the authoritativeness of law will play a crucial role in the following analysis.  
 The second distinctive feature I mentioned manifests itself in the fact that 
legal interpretations carried out by the decision-makers have an overriding 
significance. Every lawyer knows that there are many ways of understanding 
the practical requirements involved in a particular legal directive, and many 
techniques of interpretation can be mobilized to support those “understandings”. 
But the understanding that really matters is that of the judiciary. Once it is 
revealed, the debate over the correct interpretation of the directive becomes 
largely academic.14 This point is underlined by the fact that the overriding 
  
 12 See Gadamer, H.-G.: Truth and Method. London, 1989. 324–341. 
 13 This problem of specification is well brought out by Arthur Glass who rightly claims 
that Gadamer’s concept of ‘application’ is far too ambiguous from a legal theoretical point 
of view. See Glass, A.: A Hermeneutical Standpoint. In: Goldsworthy–Campbell (eds.): 
Legal Interpretation in Democratic States. op. cit. 136. However, he seems to treat it as a 
shortcoming of Gadamer’s analysis. In my view, it is not: it is an acceptable implication of 
the abstractness of Gadamer’s analysis.  
 14 Of course, there is an element of rhetorical exaggeration in this claim. The inter-
pretations of legal texts by the police, prosecutors, administrative agencies, etc. all matter 
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significance of the decision-makers’ interpretations is not dependent on their 
expertise (on their epistemic authority). Judicial interpretations are often con-
demned as mistaken (even silly) and often for good reasons. Nevertheless, they 
can and do retain their priority to rival interpretations. They can be defeated 
not by providing a better interpretation of the misinterpreted legal directives 
but by setting in motion certain institutional procedures (like legislation or 
overruling). 
 It indicates that, for a normative theory of legal interpretation, considerations 
concerning the institutional characteristics of law can turn out to be more 
decisive than anything that we can learn from any general theory of inter-
pretation. It seems to me that the most important current debates over legal 
interpretation (including the debate between the intentionalists and the non-
intentionalists) cannot really be addressed by any approach that general theories 
of interpretation can offer.15 Non-intentionalists can still win the day if they are 
capable of building their claims on a superior understanding of the institutional 
features of legal interpretation.  
 
 
Legal authority and intentionalism 
 
We have seen that the character of legal interpretation is partly determined 
by the institutional features of law. However, the law has many institutional 
features, and most of them are largely irrelevant to our present concern. We 
need to point to the particular features that may prove decisive in respect of the 
debate over intentionalism.  
 Contemporary legal theorists have many suggestions concerning this issue. 
Some of them concentrate on substantive practical philosophical issues (like 
issues of legitimacy). Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s suggestion points to a commitment 
to the value of legislative supremacy–a commitment deeply embedded in our 
ideas about constitutionalism. For Goldsworthy, legislative supremacy becomes 
an empty phrase if intentionalism fails. If the intentions of the legislators do 
not matter, we end up with some sort of judicial supremacy: the judges’ own 
value judgements will guide and limit the changes of the meanings of statutes.16 
                                                      
(even when they disagree with the judges’ understanding). But not in a way that would 
undermine the point I am trying to make. 
 15 See Glass: op. cit. 146–147. 
 16 See Goldsworthy, J.: Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal 
Positivism. In: Goldsworthy–Campbell (eds.): Legal Interpretation in Democratic States. 
op. cit. 55. Of course, substantive arguments can support non-intentionalism as well. See, 
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I find this argument particularly attractive. But the argument relies on an 
intimate connection between issues of interpretive strategy and the authority 
relations inherent in the institutional structure of law. That connection cannot be 
established without revealing important conceptual points about the authority 
of law. Substantive arguments like this must be built upon the relevant conceptual 
arguments.17 This is why my analysis will concentrate on conceptual arguments 
concerning intentionalism and non-intentionalism.  
 Many contemporary legal theorists believe that the decisive conceptual 
feature of law that is ultimately relevant to the debate over intentionalism 
concerns the authority relations on which the whole structure of law was built. 
Some of them also believe that understanding the characteristics of legal 
authority vindicates intentionalism. In the following analysis, I will take this 
view as the standard conceptual justification of intentionalism. The rest of the 
views will be seen as challenges to this argument.  
 We can easily point out the connection between the problem of legal authority 
and legal interpretation. I have mentioned above that legal interpretation aims 
at understanding the practical guidance that the law provides to us by way of 
the legal text. As practical guidance can be provided in many ways, it is part 
of the interpretive task to understand the nature of the practical guidance 
provided by the law. Successful legal interpretations presuppose a good under-
standing of the difference the law makes to our lives.  
 Sometimes the practical guidance consists in revealing reasons that are 
worth considering. (This is a version of giving advice.) But the law is not a 
system that seeks to give us mere advice. Sometimes the practical guidance 
helps us understand the connection between some pre-existing duty and a certain 
course of action. But it is not characteristic of the law to refer back to pre-
existing duties. On other occasions the practical guidance itself creates a 
duty to behave in a certain way. In this case, the practical guidance is of an 
authoritative nature. Many claim that this is exactly the kind of practical guidance 
that that law typically provides. In the typical case, legal interpretation must 
lead to understanding the directives of law as authoritatively binding on us. 
 But how is this related to the issue of intentionalism? The key conside-
ration is that legal directives are not genuinely authoritative. It is the nature of 
                                                      
e.g., Ball, T.: Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual Change. In: Leyh (ed.): Legal 
Hermeneutics… op. cit.  133–134. 
 17 On the level of conceptual analysis, it may turn out that Goldsworthy’s claim partly 
misconceives the problem of legislative supremacy. For a suggestion to this effect, see 
Allan, T. R. S.: Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review. In: 23 
(2003) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 563–584. 575. 
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authority relations that they are constituted as human relations.18 Only persons 
or groups of persons can have genuine authority. Legal directives are always 
issued by persons or groups of persons, and must be taken as manifestations of 
their authority claims. The legal directives that we reveal from legal texts have 
some kind of derivative authority: they are always some person’s (or persons’) 
judgement on other people’s conduct.19 The function of legal texts is to help us 
figure out what practical guidance the genuine authorities have given to us.  
 This formulation of the features of legal authority undeniably lends some 
support to intentionalism. It seems that such considerations (and some related 
ones) underlie Joseph Raz’s claim that the justification for treating law as valid 
derives from the authority of its makers, and laws are to be understood in light 
of the intentions of their makers. It is built into the notion of practical authority 
that law claims.20 Larry Alexander and Andrei Marmor, who use Raz’s theory of 
authority as a starting point, are both committed to pretty much the same view.21 
 
 
Challenges to intentionalism I.: The availability of legislative intentions 
 
We now have an idea of the standard conceptual justification of inten-
tionalism. We can begin to assess the challenges to it. As the pertinent version 
of intentionalism relies heavily on explaining the normativity of law in terms 
of certain authority relations, one obvious way of challenging this view is to 
call into question the account of legal authority underlying it. There are authors 
who deny that the law claims authority,22 and there are others who deny that 
law can have practical authority.23 Their views are certainly relevant for us, 
particularly because some of them have been explicitly used to put forward 
non-intentionalist claims about legal interpretation.24 However, I set aside those 
  
 18 Cf. Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994. 216–217. 
 19 See ibid. 
 20 See Raz, J.: Why Interpret? In: Ratio Juris, 9 (1996) 359. See further Raz, J.: Intention 
and Interpretation. In: George, R. P. (ed.): The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal 
Positivism. Oxford, 1996. 280. 
 21 See Alexander, L.: All or Nothing at All?: The Intentions of Authorities and the 
Authority of Intentions. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Interpretation… op. cit. 358–363. 
Marmor: Interpretation and Legal Theory. op. cit. 176. 
 22 See, e.g., Soper, Ph.: The Ethics of Deference. Cambridge, 2002. xiv. and 54. 
 23 See, e.g., Hurd, H. M.: Sovereignty in Silence. In: 99 (1990) The Yale Law Journal, 
945–1028. 1007–1022. 
 24 See e.g. Hurd, H. M.: Interpreting Authorities. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and 
Interpretation… op. cit.  
134 MÁTYÁS BÓDIG 
  
suggestions in the present essay. A proper assessment of them would require 
us to provide an extensive discussion of the theoretical problem of authority 
and the conceptual characteristics of law, and that would go well beyond the 
ambitions of the present inquiry. I am convinced, however, that there are 
important conceptual characteristics of law that cannot be accounted for if we 
deny that law claims practical authority. I have expressed and defended that 
conviction elsewhere.25 I restrict myself to the claim that an analysis of the 
normativity of law that remains within the boundaries of the Razian account of 
practical authority is still the best available theoretical option for us. I accept 
that most of the claims I make in this essay stand and fall with this contro-
versial commitment. 
 We had better turn now to other challenges to the standard conceptual 
justification of intentionalism. Many non-intentionalists think that the best way 
to undermine the intentionalist position is calling into question our ability to 
retrieve any legislative intention that could be used as a basis for interpretive 
claims. In the relevant sense, there is no legislative intention that could help 
the intentionalist. In the past twenty years, two important and influential 
authors, Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, have put forward non-inten-
tionalist claims along these lines. They certainly deserve some attention here. 
 Let me start with Waldron’s arguments. His central claim revolves around 
the obvious fact that modern statutes are produced by the deliberations of large 
multi-member assemblies.26 Waldron readily admits that intentionality plays a 
crucial role in the legislative process.27 The specific target of his critique is 
the concept of “the intention of the legislature”: there is no state or condition 
corresponding to this concept. It makes sense to talk about the intentions of the 
individual legislators but attributing particular intentions to the legislature or 
the statute is a different matter. Individual intentions usually point to various 
directions, and what we know about the intentions of individual legislators is not 
enough to settle any interpretive dispute (even though such intentions can be 
loosely associated with the human authorship of the statute). Hence, intention-
alism must be wrong. 
 The trouble with this argument is that what we have here is not really a 
refutation of the conceptual possibility of finding genuine legislative intentions 
  
 25 See Bódig, M.: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia: Jogelméleti módszertani vizsgáló-
dások [Jurisprudence and Practical Philosophy: Jurisprudential Methodological Investiga-
tions]. Miskolc, 2004. 525–527. 
 26 See Waldron, J.: Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation. In: Waldron: 
Law and Disagreement. Oxford, 1999. 121. 
 27 See ibid. 142. 
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behind a product of legislation but some difficulties that make it often difficult 
or even hopeless. It seems to me that that makes Waldron’s argument ineffective 
against several forms of intentionalism. The argument is ineffective against relying 
on “legislators’ intentions” in a minimalist sense: the legislators participate in 
a process that has legislative effect, and understand the process as having that 
function. On this ground, we can ascribe to the legislative body the intention that 
the enacted clauses should take effect as valid legal rules.28 It is more important to 
us that there is room here for another, slightly stronger sense of “legislators’ 
intentions”. Quite wisely, Waldron does not deny the possibility of group 
intentions.29 A combination of intentions can sometimes amount to a collective 
intention,30 and we have no reason to deny that it can happen to legislative 
assemblies as well. But admitting this amounts to saying that the intentionalist 
approach can work at least in some cases.31 Hence, Waldron’s argument is 
strong enough to force the intentionalist to admit that intentionalist interpretive 
strategies can break down. Furthermore, it may be strong enough to show that 
it can happen very often. However, these are claims that a sensible intentionalist 
would not deny anyway. It is enough for her to claim that legislative intentions 
matter in legal interpretation–when they are available.  
 Let me turn now to Ronald Dworkin. As is well known, his Law’s Empire 
has a series of arguments that are directed against a form of intentionalism.32 
These arguments are well known, and I will not rehearse them here. But let us 
look at the exact target of his arguments. He calls his target the “speaker’s 
meaning view” of statutory interpretation: “it assumes that legislation is an occasion 
or instance of communication and that judges look to legislative history when a 
statute is not clear on its face to discover what state of mind the legislators tried 
to communicate through their votes.”33 So the target is an extreme version of 
intentionalism that sees the task of the interpretive enterprise in retrieving 
certain mental states of the legislators. I have no wish to deny that Dworkin’s 
  
 28 See MacCormick, N.: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford, 1978. 209. In a 
sense, even Waldron grants this. See Waldron: op. cit. 127.  
 29 He seems to admit the theoretical possibility of an “Aristotelian synthesis” of the 
views and actions that contributed to the legislative process. See Waldron: op. cit. 136–
138. Andrei Marmor certainly took advantage of this when he tried to reply to Waldron’s 
non-intentionalist arguments. See his Authorities and Persons. In: Legal Theory, 1 (1995) 
337–359., 341–342. 
 30 See Bratman, M.: Shared Intention. Ethics, 104 (1993)  97–113. 
 31 Jeffrey Goldsworthy is quite right in claiming that common sense sometimes can 
reveal legislative intentions. See Goldsworthy: op. cit. 49. 
 32 See Dworkin, R.: Law’s Empire. London, 1986. 317–327. 
 33 Ibid. 315. 
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arguments are devastating for those who are committed to this “psychologised” 
version of intentionalism. But we can talk about legislative intentions in more 
than one sense,34 and there can be versions of intentionalism that are not guilty 
of this rough “psychologism”. As a matter of fact, one can see in contemporary 
versions of intentionalism a strong “depsychologising” tendency. Raz’s “inter-
pretation without retrieval”,35 the concept of “inchoate intention” developed by 
Alexander and Sherwin,36 or Allan’s “constructive intention”37 are all instructive 
examples in this respect.38 In contemporary legal theory there has been much 
argument about the meaningfulness of attributing intentions to legislative bodies. 
It seems to me that the actual upshot of those arguments is that we see the 
inadequacy of a certain “psychologising” approach to legal interpretation that 
was doomed anyway.  
 
 
Challenges to intentionalism II.: The problem with old laws 
 
In my view, the most serious challenge to the standard conceptual justification 
of intentionalism is what we may call the problem with old laws. I have 
indicated that the legislators’ intentions matter because they have authority 
over us. But what if it makes no sense, at least in a number of cases, to speak 
of the authority of those who enacted the interpreted statute? Some claim that 
this is exactly the case with laws enacted long ago. Michael Moore, for 
example, makes a case for non-intentionalism partly by claiming that much 
  
 34 Cf. Bix, B.: Questions in Legal Interpretation. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Inter-
pretation… op. cit. 142–146. 
 35 See Raz, J.: Interpretation Without Retrieval. In: Marmor (ed.): Law and Inter-
pretation… op. cit. 
 36 See Alexander, L.–Sherwin, E.: The Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas 
of Law. Durham, London, 2001. 7–14. 
 37 See Allan: Constitutional Dialogue… op. cit. 581. See further Allan, T. R. S.: 
Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intent: A Reply to Professor Craig. In: Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 4. 563–583. 568. It is worth noting that Allan’s ideas 
concerning constructive intention are hotly debated by Paul Craig, and Allan’s ideas have 
been developed partly in the debate with Craig. See Craig, P.: The Common Law, Shared 
Power and Judicial Review. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 2. 237–257., 241–
242. Craig. P.: Legislative Intent and Legislative Supremacy: A Reply to Professor Allan. 
24 (2004) 4. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24 (2004) 2. 585–596., 585–587. 
 38 Ironically, even Dworkin can be seen as advocating some sort of a “depsychologised” 
intentionalism. The judge who represents Dworkin’s ideal of proper statutory inter-
pretation “will treat Congress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law.” 
Dworkin: op. cit. 313. 
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of the legal material to be interpreted was created by people who have no 
authority above us. Their “authorship” cannot account for the claims the legal 
documents make on our actions.39 
 As far as I can see, contemporary intentionalists do not have a good answer to 
the problem of old laws. Andrei Marmor, for example, sees it as a problem of 
legal validity: we need to explain the continuing validity of the norms of the 
legal system. He claims that this continuing validity is determined by certain 
rules or conventions.40 These rules or conventions may be regarded as part of 
the “rule of recognition” of the pertinent legal system. The problem is that this 
suggestion heavily relies on a form of legal positivism (a conventionalist view 
of the normativity of law) that is highly controversial. In fact, I regard that version 
of legal positivism as profoundly mistaken.41 So I shall keep away from it. 
 In my view, the best effort to tackle the problem is made by Joseph Raz. 
His solution is based on the idea that continuity is a prominent value in legal 
systems. We attribute legal normativity to old laws because we respect the 
ethical reasons that call for continuity in the operations of the legal system.42 
This may be the best available effort but it still seems problematic to me. It 
implies that there is a crucial difference between new laws and old laws in 
respect of the grounds of their normativity. In the case of new laws, these 
grounds are associated with the authority of their makers, while in the case of 
old laws they are associated with certain specific moral values. The problem is 
that this view presupposes that some laws are normative for different reasons 
than others in our legal systems, and I see no reason to accept this presupposi-
tion.43 We should have a better way of handling the problem with old laws. 
 
 
Authority and sovereignty 
 
The problem with old laws may well be taken as indicating that we should dig 
deeper into the implications of the view that the features of legal authority 
have a crucial impact on the issue of proper interpretive strategy. The source 
of the problem is obvious. The account of legal authority that we relied on 
  
 39 See Moore: op. cit. 14. 
 40 See Marmor: Authorities and Persons. op. cit. 355. 
 41 See Bódig: op. cit. 63–102.  
 42 See Raz: Why Interpret? op. cit. 359. 
 43 I do not claim that all laws should be taken as authoritative for exactly the same 
reasons in a legal system. But Raz’s view allows for a divergence of the reasons underlying 
the normativitity of different laws that I do not find tolerable. 
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assumed that legal authority is a relation between human beings: it has a 
personal element. It serves the intentionalist position well in certain respects 
(it explains quite neatly why the legislators’ intentions matter), but it leads to 
problems where the personal “bond” between the authority and the subjects 
is broken though the directives issued by the authority still claim to be 
authoritatively binding.  
 We need a better understanding of the authority relations involved in legal 
decision-making. It may be that, at the end of the day, we will be forced to 
accept Waldron’s suggestion that we should not treat the authority of the legal 
text as dependent on the authority of its authors. We have got to give up the 
“personification” of legal authority: we have got to attribute impersonal authority 
to legislative decisions.  
 This claim happens to be another limb of Waldron’s non-intentionalist 
argument that we have taken into consideration above. According to Waldron, 
the authority of statutes has not much to do with the personal qualities of the 
legislators for the authority claim inherent in those statutes “consists in their 
ability to integrate a diversity of purposes, interests, and aims among their 
members into the text of a single legislative product”.44 If the integration of the 
diverse purposes could be carried out by an impersonal mechanism, it would 
have an equally legitimate claim to authority.45  
 I have no wish to consider here Waldron’s suggestions concerning the 
reasons that make subjection to the authority of an impersonal mechanism 
reasonable. Even if they were appealing, Waldron would still miss the point. 
The standard conceptual justification of intentionalism is not based on justi-
ficatory claims concerning certain possible versions of legal authority: it is 
based on an account of the conceptual features of legal authority. So the real 
question is whether Waldron’s suggestions46 are capable of giving a better 
account of those features. And it seems that they are not. Waldron’s impersonal 
conception of legislative authority cannot account for at least one important 
feature of the normative force of legal directives: their (relative) content-
independence.47 One can hardly attribute content-independent normative force 
to impersonal mechanisms.48  
  
 44 Waldron: op. cit. 121. 
 45 See ibid. 126–127. 
 46 See ibid. 131. 
 47 See Marmor: Authorities and Persons. op. cit. 345–346. 
 48 It is something that seems to be implied in the very definition of content-independence. 
When Joseph Raz characterizes the content-independence of authoritative directives one of 
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 It seems to me that the idea that legal authority is based on relations 
between persons is basically sound. But we have to make clearer the personal 
element of legal authority. We have got to see that legal authority is personal 
in a relatively weak sense. To see an authority relation that is personal in a 
strong sense, we may point to parental authority. It is so strongly personal that, 
in a sense, it excludes succession. It sometimes happens that a man takes the 
position of the original father in the family. Can we say that the stepfather’s 
role will be a continuation of the parental authority of the original father? I do 
not think so. The stepfather will not become a proper authority without 
successfully establishing a unique personal relationship with the children.49 
Without that, he will never have proper parental authority (no matter what 
the law says). And, if he does establish the necessary personal relationship 
successfully, his authority will have not much to do with the parental authority 
of the original father. It will be a new authority relation and not the continuation 
of a previous one. 
 Legal authority is not personal in this sense. Old legal officials are often 
replaced with new ones but it would be silly to claim that the newly appointed 
officials need to establish some special personal relationship with anyone in 
order to become proper legal authorities. They are proper authorities from the 
very moment of their appointment, and their practice is the continuation of the 
practice of their predecessors. If there are unfinished jobs (undecided cases) 
left by their predecessors, it will be their duty to finish them, and it will not be 
a new procedure in any relevant sense.  
 What should all this indicate to us? I think the difference between legal and 
parental authority has a lot to do with the fact that the legal official, unlike the 
father, does not stand for himself in the authority relation. It is not her person 
that matters but the role she plays. This is why she can be replaced without 
destroying the authority relation. One way of putting this insight is to say that 
the legal official is a representative (while the father does not represent 
anyone). For this reason, let me call the legal officials’ authority “representa-
tional authority”.50  
                                                      
the features he mentions is that “his saying so would be reason for any number of actions”. 
See his The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 1986. 35. 
 49 Of course, I have no wish to deny that someone who “takes up” the role of father 
may have roughly or exactly the same rights and duties as someone who had that role 
biologically.  
 50 This consideration is relevant to one of Waldron’s further claims. He argues that 
intentionalism is in conflict with the rule law, and, for this reason, it raises legitimacy 
problems. If we suppose that the legislators have personal authority over the law they enact 
“it is impossible that a law could have authority vis-à-vis a legislator.”  Waldron: op. cit. 
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 Some elements of this claim can be found in several theoretical accounts,51 
and it is should sound familiar for those aware of the ordinary facts of 
everyday legal practice. Judges do not announce their decisions in their own 
name: they announce them in the name of the Republic or the Crown or 
something like that. Statutes are not kept in the archives under the name of the 
particular legislators.52 But how could it provide the basis for tackling the 
problem with old laws? Well, it allows us to say that, in the case of legislative 
authority, it is not a particular group of legislators to which we should attribute 
authority but an institutionalized assembly that is “filled” with different members 
time to time without any real change in the character of the underlying 
authority relation. Even if all the former members are replaced with new ones, 
the proceedings of the assembly will be the continuation of the same authority 
relation. Old laws have the same authority as the new ones if they are associated 
with the same authority relation. They are embedded in a continuous authoritative 
practice.53  
 It seems obvious to me that this revised version of the standard conceptual 
justification is still good enough to give support to the intentionalist cause. 
Institutions like legislative assemblies do not exercise their authority without 
having members who act in their name. Although the legislators are only 
representatives, as long as they hold their positions in the legislature they are 
the ones who are entrusted to provide practical guidance in the form of 
statutes: their intentions matter. And, in this respect, there is no difference 
between the legislators of the present and the past.54 
                                                      
139. We can fend off this objection, however, by insisting that the legislators have personal 
authority over the law only within the limits of their institutional role. In every other 
respect, they are no less bound by it than any other subject. See Marmor: Authorities and 
Persons. op. cit. 355. 
 51 Cf. Raz, J.: On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries. 
In: Alexander, L. (ed.): Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations. Cambridge, 1998. 184–
185. See further Marmor: Authorities and Persons. op. cit. 355. 
 52 Cf. MacCormick, N.: Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts. Law and Philosophy. 
17 (1998) 301–345. 332. 
 53 Of course, there may be complications with this approach. As the right to legislate 
is sometimes transferred from one assembly to another, we will have to cope with the 
problems of institutional change.  
 54 This point could be amplified by a consideration that I largely ignore here. The fact 
that different legal officials operate within the framework of identical or closely related 
authority relations manifests itself in the fact that the legislators’ decisions become 
embedded in the practice of many other officials who will inevitably shape them. Later 
legislators amend the old statutes, and the judicial practice has an impact on the ways they 
are understood. 
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Legal Authority and Sovereignty 
 
Though this may sound promising, the analysis is in need of a series of further 
clarifications if it is to be regarded as really successful in solving our problems 
with old laws. We have got to provide an answer to the question: “who is 
represented by the legislators?” There are two kinds of answers that certainly 
will not do here. It would be misguided to claim that legislators are represen-
tatives of the law because our problem raises questions about the way the law 
itself becomes authoritative. The very existence of law presupposes certain 
authority relations that we have to account for here. It would be equally misguided 
to claim that legislators are the representatives of the legislative assembly to 
which they belong. Legislative bodies do not exist until they are set up by 
certain people.  
 It is quite clear what kind of answer we need. If we raise questions concerning 
the grounds of the officials’ authority we want to know something about 
sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty is a tricky issue partly because sovereignty 
can have several sources and can take several forms. But this is not the real 
problem: we can restrict our attention (without fatally undermining the validity 
claims of our analysis) to the case of constitutional democracies where we 
have a standard answer to the question of the source of authority. In respect of 
constitutional democracies, the first step in the analysis is easy. The legislators 
openly announce themselves as representatives: representatives of the people. 
It seems that we need to look for some conception of popular sovereignty, and 
the legislators should be treated as representatives of the political community 
as a whole. However, a series of conceptual problems are likely to arise at this 
point. One could say that political communities are not agents: they never make 
decisions, and never set up institutions. And although the political community’s 
inability to act explains why it needs representatives, it is likely to make highly 
controversial any suggestion concerning the process that endows legal institu-
tions and officials with their authority.  
 Of course, there can be ways of handling this problem. For example, we can 
take recourse to political morality, and argue that some shared political morality 
turns a multitude of people into a political community.55 Then, official action 
(and, most of all, the legislative practice) can be treated as authoritative as long 
as it remains within the boundaries of that shared political morality. Justificatory 
question concerning the practice of the officials can be tentatively answered 
with the help of a legitimising process in which the ordinary members of 
the political community are invited to participate. Unfortunately, this line of 
  
 55 See Bódig: op. cit. 540–541. 
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argument is likely to lead to a series of controversial and rather counter-
intuitive claims–and not only because one can reasonably doubt whether we can 
in fact find a shared political morality in an existing political community. There 
is something odd in treating the law as being based on a pre-existing political 
morality. Typically, it is the law (especially the Constitution) that helps people 
acknowledge the issues of political morality, and it functions as the best reliable 
source of information about the political morality of their community. 
 Although I have struggled with them,56 I have no wish to pretend that I know 
how to handle those extremely complicated issues. However, I am sure that we 
have to confront them if we work on normative theories of legal interpretation. 
It does not mean that anyone who is about to rely on intentionalist interpretive 
strategies must tackle the problems of sovereignty. But the theoretical efforts 
cannot escape them. In order to have a proper understanding of the distinctive 
features of legal interpretation, we need to refer to the grounds of law’s 
normativity, and it leads to some of the complicated problems of normative 
political theory.  
 It is important to emphasise that the core idea that I set forth here is not at all 
alien to contemporary analyses of the problem of legal interpretation.57 It is hard 
to deny that legal interpretation has a lot to do with the proper allocation of 
institutionalized public authority in a society. When the constitutional inter-
pretation is at issue, legal theorists tend to realise this. Both Joseph Raz’s and 
Michael Moore’s accounts of constitutional interpretation heavily rely on claims 
concerning the grounds of the normativity of the Constitution.58 In this that 
respect, most legal theorists realise that the theoretical problems of legal 
interpretation raise political philosophical issues. We need to take it seriously 
when we conduct our debates over intentionalism. 
  
 56 See ibid. 525–535. 
 57 See Allan: Constitutional Dialogue… op. cit. 582–583. 
 58 See Raz: On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions. op. cit. 173. See 
Moore: op. cit. 14. 
